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The Attorney-Client Privilege:
Does It Really Have Life Everlasting?
BY RICHARD C. WYDICK °
INTRODUCTION
hanks to prommentnewspaperheadlines in the summer of 1998,
members of the American public may now think that the secrets
they share with their lawyers will remain secret forever and
ever. The truth is not quite that simple. In Swidler & Berlin v. United
StatesI the United States Supreme Court did say that the attorney-client
privilege continues to live after the client dies, but the Court did not say
how long it lives, nor did the Court mention that the privilege lives longer
m some places than in others.
Swdler & Berlin made headlines, not because of public thirst for
knowledge about the attorney-client privilege, but because the cast of
characters included first lady Hillary Clinton, special prosecutor Kenneth
Starr, and Vincent Foster, a White House lawyer who committed suicide
in the middle of an investigation of supposed wrongdoing at the White
House. In May 1993, someone ordered the firing of seven employees ofthe
White House travel office.2 The firing provoked congressional and other
investigations, and Vincent Foster (a former law partner of Hillary Clinton)
was the White House lawyer assigned to ride herd on the investigations. 3
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. B.A. 1959, Williams
College; LL.B. 1962, Stanford Umversity. The author wishes to thank Donna
Hooper, m the U.C. Davis School of Law class of 1999, for her research assistance
on this Article. The author also wishes to thank Edward Imwmkelned, of the U.C.
Davis law faculty, for his help on a key part of the Article, and to thank Victor
Tunkel, Secretary of the Selden Society and member of the law faculty of Queen
Mary and Westfield College, London, for his help on the English law of attorney-
client privilege.
ISwidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
2 See id. at 2083.
3See id., Ruth Marcus & Susan Schmidt, Attorney-ClientPnvilegeAfterDeath
Is Upheld, WASH. POST, June 26, 1998, at Al.
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On a Sunday morning m the summer of 1993, Vincent Foster went to
the home of attorney James Hamilton, a partner m the private law firm of
Swidler & Berlin, to seek legal representation m connection with the travel
office matter.4 At the outset, Foster asked Hamilton whether their
conversation would be privileged, and Hamilton assured hun that it would
be.5 During their meeting, Hamilton took several pages of handwritten
notes.6 The word "privileged" is one of the first items to appear m these
notes.7 Nine days after this meeting, Foster committed suicide.8
In 1995, Starr started investigating whether certain people had lied or
obstructed justice in the earlier investigations of the travel office matter.9
At Starr's request, a federal grand jury subpoenaed Hamilton's three pages
of handwritten notes.10 Hamilton and his law firm asserted the attorney-
client privilege on behalf of their deceased client, Vincent Foster." The
district court examined the handwritten notes m camera and concluded that
the attorney-client privilege protected them from disclosure. 2
'See Marcus & Schmidt, supra note 3, atA18; Transcript of Oral Argument at
3, Swdler & Berlin (No. 97-1192), available in 1998 WL 309279.
' See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Swidler & Berlin (No. 97-1192),
available in 1998 WL 309279.
6 See Swidler &Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2083.
7 See id.
I See id.
9 See id. Prosecutor Starr's investigation of the travel office matter never
resulted in charges being filed against anyone. See Marcus & Schmidt, supra note
3, at Al. In presenting the Monica Lewmsky matter to the House Judiciary
Committee, Starr said this about his travel office investigation:
Let me add a few brief words about the Travel Office matter. This phase of
work arose out of investigations by others of the 1993 firings of Billy Dale
and six career co-workers. We do not anticipate that any evidence gathered
in that investigation will be relevant to the committee's current task. The
President was not involved in our Travel Office investigation.
As to the status of that investigation, it was on hold for quite awhile, in
partbecause of litigation. The investigation is not terminated, butwe expect
to announce any decisions and actions soon.
Kenneth Starr, Investigation of the President (visited Jan. 19, 1999) <http://www.
cspan.org/guide/executive/investigation/starrl 1 1998.htm>
10 See Swdler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2083.
" See id.
'
2See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230,231 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd by Swdler
& Berlin, 118 S. Ct. 2081. The district court also held that the handwritten notes
were protected under the work-product doctrine, see id. at 236, but this Article does
not consider that part of the case.
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Prosecutor Starr appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed. 3 The court of appeals said there should be a
new exception to the attorney-client privilege, an exception that would
open a client's privileged material to discovery m a criminal case if the
client is dead and if the material's "relative importance" to the criminal
case is "substantial."' 4 To decide what is "substantial" and what is not, a
judge would consider whether the privileged material bears on a "signifi-
cant aspect" of the criminal case and whether there is a scarcity or an
abundance of other reliable evidence on that aspect of the case. 5
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, rejecting that court's
newly-minted exception to the attorney-client privilege and holding that
lawyer Hamilton's handwritten notes were protected by the privilege even
after client Foster's death.16 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion, which was joined by five other Justices. A dissenting opinion,
written by Justice O'Connor and joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
argued in favor of the position taken by the court of appeals. 7
Part I ofthis Article discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Swidler
& Berlin, particularly the role of empirical evidence m the decision. Part
II discusses a significant issue that the Court did not decide-how long after
the client's death should the attorney-client privilege remain alive?
I. THE SUPREME COuRT's DECISION IN SWIDLER & BERLIN
A. Federal Rule ofEvidence 501
In order to understand what the Supreme Court did and did not decide
in Swdler & Berlin, one can start with Federal Rule of Evidence 501, the
rule that governs privileges in federal court proceedings. Roughly
paraphrased, Rule 501 tells federal judges to apply state privilege law in
diversity of citizenship cases, where state law supplies the rule of
decision.18 In all other cases-such as federal criminal cases and federal civil
cases not based on diversity jursdiction-Rule 501 requires federal judges
to apply the common law of privilege, as interpreted by federal courts m
the "light of reason and experience."' 19
3 See id. at 231.




6 See Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2083-88.
17 See id. at 2088-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
' See FED. R. EvID. 501.
19 Id.
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The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not plan it that way
The drafters proposed a comprehensive set of privilege rules that would
have replaced the common law of privilege and would have applied in all
federal court proceedings, even those based on diversityjunsdiction. 0 The
proposed rules codified privileges for attorney-client communications,
psychotherapist-patient communications, communications to clergy
members, spousal testimony, political votes, trade secrets, state secrets,
identity of informers, and certain required reports that are privileged by
statute.2' When the Supreme Court sent the Federal Rules of Evidence to
Congress, the privilege provisions proved to be highly controversial?
Because the controversy threatened to hold up the entire project, Congress
decided to jettison all of the drafters' proposed privilege provisions and to
substitute present Rule 501 m their place. z3
Swidler & Berlin arose out of a federal criminal investigation, namely,
Starr's investigation of the travel office matter. Therefore, under Rule 501,
the applicable privilege law was the common law as interpreted by the
federal courts in the "light of reason and experience." '24 Notice the
uncommon freedom this gives a federaljudge. Thejudge need not struggle
to discover the intent of the legislators who wrote a statute, nor the intent
of the framers of the Constitution. The judge need not follow the law of a
state or foreign jurisdiction. Rather, the judge is unleashed, free to make
law-the federal common law of privilege-and constrained only by sound
policy and the doctrine of stare decisis.
B. The Common Law Precedents
Chief Justice Rehnquist began the majority's analysis m Swidler &
Berlin by noting that the attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest
2 0See S.REP. NO. 93-1277 (1974), reprntedm 1974U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051,7053;
CHRISTOPHERB. MUELLER &LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE §§ 5.3- 4, at 336-
43 (1995).21 See FED.R. EVID. 502-510 (deleted), reprinted in 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
&KENNETHW GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rejected Rule
502, at 3, Rejected Rule 503, at 37 (1986); 25 id. Rejected Rule 504, at 5, Rejected
Rule 505, at 425; 26 id. Rejected Rule 506, at 8, Rejected Rule 507, at 233,
Rejected Rule 508, at 282; 26A id. Rejected Rule 509, at 8, Rejected Rule 510, at
298.
2See S. REP. NO. 93-1277, supra note 20, at 7053; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 20, § 5.3, at 337
2 See H.R. REP No. 93-650 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075,
7082-83; H.R. CONF REP NO. 93-1597 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7098, 7100-01.24 FED. R. EVID. 501.
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recognized privileges.?5 He then offered the traditional utilitarian justifica-
tion for the privilege: it promotes full, truthful communication between
clients and their attorneys.2 6 Tis free communication allows attorneys to
give their clients better legal advice and legal service, which m turn creates
the greatest good for everyone involved in the administration ofjustice. 7
The Chief Justice next pointed out that the common law cases
uniformly either hold or assume that the attorney-client privilege lives on
after the client dies.28 Likewise, he noted, commentators uniformly
5 See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2084 (1998). Under
modem law, the privilege exists only for the benefit of the client, not for the benefit
of the attorney. For example, California law allows the attorney to claim the
privilege, but only on behalf of the client. See CAL EvID. CODE §§ 912, 953-955
(West 1995). Also, the attorney cannot waive the privilege without authorization
by the client. See id. From time to time, members of the legal profession have
suggested that attorneys get more benefit from the privilege than clients do. The
most famous was Jeremy Bentham. See Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial
Evidence, Specially Applied to English Practice, in 7 THE WORK OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 472-76 (Bowring ed., 1843). More recently, Professor Daniel Fischel
has argued that the attorney-client privilege and the associated ethics rules about
confidentiality slueld guilty people, harm innocent people, and give lawyers an
unwarranted competitive advantage over comparable professionals, thus allowing
lawyers to charge bloated legal fees. See Danel R. Fischel, Lawyers and
Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REv 1 (1998). Doubtless Professor Fischel enjoyed
hearing lawyers howl when something like the attorney-client privilege was
granted to certified public accountants in tax cases. See I.R.C. § 7525(a) (West
Supp. 1998); Mark Thompson, A Taxing Matter- Lawyers are Bracing for
Competition from Accounting Firms, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1998, at 1726 See Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2084.
27 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,389 (1981), where the Court
spelled out the utilitarian line of reasoning as follows:
[The purpose of the attorney-client privilege] is to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interest in the observance of law and administration of
justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's
being fully informed by the client.
Id. Briefly stated, classical utilitanamsm holds that the best course of action in a
given situation is the one that creates the greatest total good for all persons who are
affected by the action. See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 24-26 (Samuel
Gorovitz ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1971); JAMEs RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 90-103 (1986).
2 See Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2084-86.
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acknowledge the general rule that the privilege survives the client's death. 9
The most frequently used exception to the general rule is the poorly named
"testamentary" exception, which makes the privilege mapplicable to a
commumcation to or from a now-deceased client in a dispute between
parties who both claim an interest through that client, either by testate or
intestate succession or by an inter vivos transfer.3 The existence of the
testamentary exception is itselfproofthat the privilege survives the client's
death; if the privilege did not survive, the exception would be not be
needed.
Prosecutor Starr tried using the testamentary exception as a building
block in his argument for a new exception that would apply when the client
is dead and when the privileged information is needed in a criminal
investigation.31 If the public interest m settling estates accurately is enough
to trump the privilege, Starr argued, then surely the public interest m
investigating crimes is also enough to do the same. 2 In rejecting this
argument, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the purpose of the
testamentary exception is to carry out the deceased client's mtent.33 The
client would presumably want the attorney to reveal the confidential
information to ensure that the client's wishes are accurately carried out.34
In contrast, there is no reason to suppose that revealing the confidential
29 See id. at 2086. The leading law review article is Simon J. Frankel, The
Attorney-Client Privilege After theDeath ofthe Client, 6 GEO. J. LEGALETHICs 45
(1992). Also helpful is Brian R. Hood, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and a
Revised Rule 1.6: Permitting Limited Disclosure After the Death of the Client, 7
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 741 (1994). The treatises that discuss the issue include 1
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 94, at 348-50 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.
1992); MUELLER&KIRKPATRICK,sUpra note 20, § 5.26, at 430-31, 8 JOHNHENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2323 (John T. McNaughton
ed., 1961); CHARLES W WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.3, at 255-56
(1986); and 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 21, § 5498, at 483-84. The
RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTHELAWGOVERNINGLAWYERS § 127 cmt c (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996) likewise acknowledges the general rule that the privilege
survives the death of the client.
" See UNIF. R. EVID. 502(d)(2); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERN-
ING LAWYERS § 131.31 See Swdler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2085-86; Brief for the United States at 17-
18, Swidler & Berlin (No. 97-1192), available in 1998 WL 271193.
32 See Brief for the United States at 17-18, Swidler & Berlin (No. 97-1192),
available in 1998 WL 271193.
33 See Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2085-86.
34 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 5.24, at 428, 429.
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information to further a criminal investigation would carry out the client's
intent25
The Supreme Court also rejected the court of appeals' idea of using a
balancing test that would override a deceased client's attorney-client
privilege only if the requested material's "relative importance" in a
criminal case is "substantial." '36 In earlier cases, the Court has stressed the
importance of predictability and certainty in the law of privilege. When
a client is deciding whether to tell her lawyer the truth, she cannot predict
whether the information will later become relevant m a criminal case rather
than a civil one, nor can she predict whether the information will become
relatively important rather than utterly insignificant.38 As the Court said in
an earlier case, "[a]n uncertain privilege is little better than no privilege
at alr."39
C. The Shortage ofEmpincal Evidence
In the majority opinion, the Chief Justice conceded that some highly
respected commentators have favored curtailing the privilege after the
client's death-some by simply ending the privilege at the client's death,
and others by creating a rule that after the client's death the privilege can
be overridden for compelling reasons.40
3s See Swmdler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2086.
36 See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230,235 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd by Swidler
& Berlin, 118 S. Ct. 2081.
31 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1996); Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).31 See Swdler &Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2087
39 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
40 See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 29, § 94, at 349-50 (arguing
that the privilege should end at the client's death); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 20, § 5.26, at 431-32 (advocating the post-death overriding of the
privilege in extreme cases, such as a dead client's confession to a murder that is
charged to a criminal defendant); WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 6.3, at 255-56
(questioning the need for continuing the privilege after the client's death); 24
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 21, § 5498, at 483-84 (arguing that the privilege
should end with the client's death, or at least when the client's estate is settled).
The Restatement ofthe Law GoverningLawyers suggests creating anew exception
to the privilege. The new exception would permit a court to ovemde the privilege
of a deceased client when the communication "bears on a litigated issue of pivotal
significance." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHELAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 127(d)
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). Subsection (d) concedes that "no court or
1998-991 1171
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The positions of all these respected commentators have one feature m
common: they are not based on empirical evidence. Rather, they are based
on what could charitably be described as "appeals to reason" or uncharita-
bly as "ipse dixit." 1 Consider the McCormick treatise as an example. It
argues that the attorney-client privilege should end with the death of the
client, and it asserts: "This could not to any substantial degree lessen the
encouragement for free disclosure which is the purpose of the privilege. 42
Dean McCormick provides no authority, empirical or otherwise, for the
quoted sentence.43
Chief Justice Rehnquist was troubled by what he perceived as a
shortage of empirical evidence either to prove or disprove that a client will
be less likely to tell her lawyer the truth if the communication is not
privileged after the client's death. He mentioned this point once during the
oral argument 4 and twice m the majority opinion.45 Ultimately, the Chief
legislature" has recognized such an exception. Id.
41 Ipse dixit means roughly: it's so because I say so. For a higher quality
definition, see BRYAN A. GARNER, ADICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 468
(2d ed. 1995).
42 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 29, at 350.
43 The argument and the quoted sentence are from Dean McCormick's own pen,
almost entirely unaltered by the faithful scholars who have revised and expanded
the McCormick treatise after Is death. See CHARLEs T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 98, at 199, 200 (1954).
" See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Swidler & Berlin v United States,
118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998) (No. 97-1192), available in 1998 WL 309279. The Chief
Justice observed:
Another thing it shows is the woeful dearth of any empirical research m the
legal profession, because the kind of questions that Justice Breyer and some
of the rest of us asked, you know, if lawyers were polled as to how they
treated client confidences, and people asked prosecutors, we would have a
much better idea of how to decide tlus case than someone writes a law
review article and says, here's what I think.
Id. 45 See Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2087 n.4, 2088. The empirical evidence
that was closest to the point at hand was a ground-breaking study by ProfessorFred
C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWAL. REV. 351 (1989). Zacharias's
article was not directly on point because it concerned the attorney's ethical duty of
confidentiality rather than the attorney-client privilege, involved civil litigation
only, and was devoted to broader questions about confidentiality rather than the
narrow issue of how long the attorney-client privilege ought to last. Nonetheless,
Professor Zacharias's findings do offer some general support for Starr's position.
Professor Zacharias found, for example, that clients are generally poorly informed
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Justice used the commentators' own trick to deal with the lack of empirical
evidence-he simply stated his position with gusto, leaving the unconvinced
to disprove it if they can:
Despite the scholarly criticism, we think there are weighty reasons that
counsel in favor of posthumous application [of the attorney-client
privilege]. Knowing that commumcations will remain confidential even
after death encourages the client to communicate fully and frankly with
counsel. While the fear of disclosure, and the consequent withholding of
information from counsel, may be reduced if disclosure is limited to
posthumous disclosure in a criminal context, it seems unreasonable to
assume that it vamshes altogether. Clients may be concerned about
reputation, civil liability, or possible harm to friends or family. Posthu-
mous disclosure of such commumcations may be as feared as disclosure
during the client's lifetime.46
D. Empirical Evidence and the Autonomy Justification for the Attorney-
Client Privilege
If we depend solely on the utilitarian justification for the attorney-
client privilege,47 then we should indeed be troubled by the shortage of
about the scope of the attorney's duty of confidentiality; about half the clients in
the study said they would withhold information from an attorney if there were no
firm duty of confidentiality, but half of that half believed incorrectly that the
present duty of confidentiality is absolute and unrestricted. See id. at 380-81.
Almost 30% of the clients in the study claimed that in the past they had given
information to an attorney that they would not have given without a guarantee of
confidentiality, but some of those may have relied, not on a guarantee, but on a
general sense that lawyers are fairly honorable people. See id. If confidentiality
rules are thought to promote forthrghtness from clients, then one would expect
lawyers to inform clients accurately about the rules at an early stage of the
attorney-client relationslup. Nonetheless, ProfessorZachanas found that more than
20% of the lawyers in the study almost never so inform their clients, and that nearly
60% do so less than half the time. See id. at 382. Clients do seem to learn about
confidentiality from somewhere, perhaps television, but only about one-third of
them get it right. Over 40% dunk confidentiality is broader than it really is, and
over 25% think it is narrower than it really is. See id. at 383. Worse yet, over 70%
of the lawyers studied admitted that they tell clients "'only generally that all
communications are confidential.' "Id. at 386. Only 28% of the lawyers questioned
told their clients that the duty of confidentiality has exceptions. See id.46 Swdler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2086.
4 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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empirical evidence about whether the candor of attorney-client communi-
cations would or would not be lessened if the privilege were curtailed at the
client's death. The attorney-client privilege has an additional justification,
one not mentioned in the ChiefJustice's opinion for the majority. Professor
David Louisell laid the first stones of the additional justification over forty
years ago.48 Loisell suggested that Wigmore, despite his extraordinary
contributions to evidence law, did lawyers a disservice by stressing
utilitarian justifications for the attorney-client privilege and the other main
communications privileges, virtually ignoring other possible justifi-
cations.49 Louisell argued that these communications privileges are not
mere exclusionary evidence rules that prevent courts from getting to the
truth."0 There are some things, he wrote, that are: "even more important to
human liberty than accurate adjudication. One of them is the right to be left
by the state unmolested m certain human relations."51 Explaining further,
he wrote: "Primarily [the communications privileges] are a right to be let
alone, a right to unfettered freedom, m certain narrowly prescribed
relationships, from the state's coercive or supervisory powers and from the
nuisance of its eavesdropping. '52
Subsequent writers have expanded andrefined Louisell's formulation,53
and some have shifted from Louisell's emphasis on the right to be let alone
to an emphasis on the broader concept of human autonomy-the freedom to
control one's own life and destiny -1 Most recently, Professor Edward
Imwmkelned has published a preliminary sketch ofthe autonomy rationale
he is developing in his forthcoming revision of the privilege volume of the
Wigmore treatise.55 Imwmkelnedparts company with Loisell by pointing
48 See David W Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity, and Confusion:
Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV 101 (1956).
" See id. at 111-12. Louisell regarded the main communications privileges as
attorney-client, priest-penitent, husband-wife, and to a lesser extent physician-
patient. See id. at 107-08.
50 See id. at 101, 110-11.
51 Id. at 110.
521d. at 110-11.
53 See, e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 5.1, at 329, 331-32;
Thomas G. Krattenmaker, TestimonialPnvileges in Federal Courts: AnAlternative
to the Proposed FederalRules ofEvidence, 62 GEO.L.J. 61,85-94(1973); see also
Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimomal Pnvileges Under the Federal
Rules ofEvidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 GEO. L.J. 613,648-57 (1976).54 See Frankel, supra note 29, at 53-55.
' See Edward Imwinkelned, The Rivalry Between Truth and Privilege: The
Weakness of the Supreme Court's Instrumental Reasoning in Jaffee v. Redmond,
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out that privacy (the "right to be let alone," as Louisell put it) 6 is not itself
an ultimate value or an ultimate moral good-penitents and spouses and
clients and patients all want privacy, but so do burglars and terrorist
revolutionaries." Autonomy, in contrast, is an ultimate moral good in our
society, and it is linked to privacy and the law ofpnvilege in the following
way 58 In order to be autonomous, a person must sometimes form a
relationship of trust with another person.59 Suppose, for example, that X's
life is punctuated by periods of deep depression, during which X cannot
function as a fully autonomous person. Suppose that Xcan overcome his
condition only by forming a trusting relationship with someone who has
special training in psychotherapy, religion, or medicine. But suppose Xis
willing to. form that trusting relationslp only under conditions of privacy,
in which Xcan share information about himselfwith assurance that it will
not be disclosed to outsiders. If the law provides a commuications
privilege for tls relationslp, the privilege helps to makeXautonomous by
enabling him to make better life choices without surrendering his independ-
ence. Here is how Professor Imwmkelned distinguishes this line of
argument from the traditional utilitarian line: "The linchpin of this line of
argument is the positive theory of freedom. The theory is a normative
proposition rather than an empirical hypothesis. As such, the theory is
tested by examinng its consistency with liberal democratic theory rather
than by subjecting it to experimentation or scientific investigation."'
E. How the Autonomy Justification Relates to the Court's Decision
in Swidler & Berlin
We have seen previously that Chief Justice Rehnquist was troubled by
what he perceived to be a shortage of empirical evidence about the effect
that curtailing the attorney-client privilege would have on the level of
candor m attorney-client commuications.6" However, if the attorney-client
privilege is viewed as a tool to further human autonomy, then a court does
49 HASTINGS L.J. 969 (1998). The privilege volume of the Wigmore treatise is 8
WIGMORE, supra note 29.
6 Louisell, supra note 48, at 110.
51 See Imwinkelned, supra note 55, at 984-85.
" See id. at 985-86.
'9 See id.
60Id. at 988.
61 See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
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not need empirical evidence when it considers a proposed change m
privilege law. It can make an ordinary policy judgment about how much
human autonomy it wants to promote.
In effect, that is precisely what Chief Justice Rehnquist did in the
majority opinion in Swidler & Berlin. Take a second look at the passage in
which the Chief Justice stated the majority's position:
Despite the scholarly criticism, we think there are weighty reasons that
counsel in favor of posthumous application [of the attorney-client
privilege]. Knowing that communications will remain confidential even
after death encourages the client to commumcate fully and frankly with
counsel. While the fear of disclosure, and the consequent withholding of
information from counsel, may be reduced if disclosure is limited to
posthumous disclosure in a criminal context, it seems unreasonable to
assume that it vanishes altogether. Clients may be concerned about
reputation, civil liability, or possible harm to friends or family. Posthu-
mous disclosure of such communications may be as feared as disclosure
during the client's lifetime.62
In other words, empirical evidence or not, a living client's present concern
about what may happen to his reputation, friends, and family after he dies
is an important interest that the law ought to protect. Even without
empirical evidence that the lack of a privilege might deter the client from
making the communication, conferring privilege protection is consistent
with the positive theory of freedom. In short, the majority opinion m
Swidler & Berlin makes sense as an autonomy decision even though it
lacks empirical support from a utilitarian standpoint.
II. How LONG SHOULD THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE STAY ALIVE AFTER THE CLIENT DIES?
In Swidler & Berlin, the Court resolved two narrow issues. First, it
decided that under the federal common law of privilege,6" the attorney-
62Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2086 (1998).
63 By "federal common law of privilege," I mean the version of the common
law that a federal court applies in anondiversity case-the body of law thatFederal
Rule of Evidence 501 calls "the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."
FED. K EVID. 501, see supra text accompanying notes 18-24.
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client privilege lives on after the client's death.6 Second, it held that
attorney Hamilton's three pages of handwritten notes about lus confidential
conversation with deceased client Vincent Foster were protected by the
privilege and did not have to be produced for use in prosecutor Starr's
criminal investigation.6
The Court did not decide some other issues that are interesting but that
did not need to be decided in order to dispose of the case at hand. First, it
did not decide anything whatsoever about the attorney-client privilege in
a case governed by state privilege law-either a case pending m a state court
or a case pending in a federal court because of diversity of citizenship.66
Second, in cases governed by the federal common law of privilege, the
Court did not decide how long the attorney-client privilege should stay
alive after the client dies.
A. The Distinction Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and the
Attorney's Ethzcal Duty to Safeguard the Client's Confidential
Information
In considering how long the attorney-client privilege ought to endure
after the client dies, we must distinguish between the attorney-client
privilege and its sister doctrine, the attorney's ethical duty to safeguard the
client's confidential information.
1. The Ethxcal Duty
Ethical obligations prohibit an attorney from voluntarily using or
disclosing information concerning the client that is not generally known
and that the attorney acquires in the course of representing the client.67 For
example, it is the ethical duty, not the attorney-client privilege, that
prevents an attorney from telling a friend juicy bits of confidential
information about a client.
The ethical duty covers more kinds of information than does the
attorney-client privilege. The privilege protects only confidential communi-
cations between an attorney and a client, or their respective agents, made
6See Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2088.
65 See id.
6See FED. R. EVID. 501, see supra text accompanying notes 18-24.
67 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 111-12
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1998).
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for the purpose of giving legal service to or getting legal service for the
client.68 The ethical duty, on the other hand, covers not only confidential
communications that are covered by the privilege, but also any other
information concerning the client-from whatever source-that the attorney
acquires m the course of representing the client and that is not generally
known.69
The ethical duty has a number of exceptions, 7° one ofwhich permits an
attorney to reveal a client's confidential information when doing so is
required by law 7' An attorney who violates hIs or her ethical duty is
subject to discipline by the bar7 2 and may also be liable to the client for
injuries caused by the violation.73
The ethical duty of confidentiality lasts as long as the attorney
possesses the client's confidential information.7' It lasts beyond the end of
both the attorney's representation of the client and the client's death.75 A
part of the attorney's ethical duty is to take proper care of the client's files
(both current and closed files), to destroy systematically closed files that
are no longer needed, and to arrange for proper disposition of the client's
files if the attorney dies, gets sick, retires, or is disciplined.76 Without citing
any case law or other authority, the Restatement allows a lawyer to
cooperate with reasonable efforts by outsiders to get information about a
61 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 118-
22.
69Seeid. § 111.
70 See id. §§ 113-17A.
71 See id. § 115. Thus, when the attorney is called as a witness, and the court
correctly rules that aparticular communication is not coveredby the attorney-client
privilege and must therefore be disclosed, the attorney does not breach her etlucal
duty by obeying the court's order and disclosing the communication. However, if
there is reason to doubt the correctness of the court's ruling, the attorney may-and
sometimes must-take appropriate steps to test the court's ruling. See id. § 115 cmt.
b.
72 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998).
7 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWERS § 112 cmt
a; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71
(Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997) (detailing civil liability of lawyer to client).
74 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 cmt.
e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
75 See id.76See id.
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client for "public purposes, such as historical research" when there is no
"material risk" to a client's finances, reputation, or similar interests."
2. The Attorney-Client Prvilege
In contrast to the attorney's ethical duty to safeguard confidences, the
attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence law 78 The attorney-client
privilege limits the power of a government tribunal to use the twin tools of
coercion-the subpoena power and the contempt sanction-to force people
to produce a certain kind of evidence.79 That certain kind of evidence is
evidence about a confidential communication between an attorney and a
client, or their respective agents, for the purpose of giving legal service to
or getting legal service for the client."0
Strictly speaking, the attorney-client privilege applies onlyto situations
in which a governmental tribunal seeks to compel someone to give
evidence. Thus it is a narrower doctrine than the ethical duty to safeguard
a client's confidential information. We sometimes loosely say that an
attorney who reveals a client's confidential information in a gossipy
lunchtime conversation with a friend has violated the attorney-client
privilege, but that is not accurate. The attorney-client privilege does not
apply to voluntary disclosure over the lunch table; it applies only to
disclosure under government compulsion. The attorney who gossips with
a friend over lunch has not violated the privilege; he has betrayed the
ethical duty to safeguard the client's confidential information.
Distingushmg between the ethical duty and the privilege is helpful
when it comes to deciding how long after a client's death the privilege
" Id. § 112 cmt. h. The Reporter's Note to comment h suggests the need to
create a legal clearance procedure that would balance the public's interest in
historical and other research against the confidentiality interests of the client or the
client's successors. See id.
7 See, e.g., UNF. R. EVID. 502; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERN-
ING LAWYERS §§ 118, 135.
7 Absent a privilege, the public has a right to every person's evidence. See
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 911
(West 1995). Thus, if no privilege applies, a government tribunal can use its
subpoena power and contempt sanction to compel a person either to give the
evidence or to go to jail. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1826
(1998); FED. R. Civ. P 45(a).




should last. The distinction reminds us that setting the duration of the
privilege at something short of eternity would not produce chaos. The
nation's lawyers would not rush into the streets, scattering the files of dead
clients hither and yon. They would not entertain us on television talk shows
with the truth about the rich, famous, and recently deceased. If the privilege
were to expire short of eternity, the only consequence would be that courts
and other governmental tribunals could compel a witness who knows the
content of a formerly privileged communication to reveal it m a legal
proceeding to which it is relevant.
B. Rational Choices for the Duration of the Attorney-Client
Privilege
In deciding what to set as the duration of the attorney-client privilege,
we have at least four rational choices:
1. Lifetime of the Client
As noted above, the Swidler & Berlin decision rejects this choice for
cases that are governed by the federal common law of evidence.8' The
majority opinon conceded, however, that ending the privilege at the
client's death is not a frivolous idea. 2 Indeed some of the keenest minds m
the field of evidence law have advocated it, including Judge Learned
Hand,83 Harvard evidence professor Edmund M. Morgan, 4 and treatise
author Charles T. McCormick of the University of Texas. 5 My research
reveals, however, that it is not the law of any state, nor is it the common
law of England.86
81 See supra Part I.
See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2088 (1998).
83 See E.M. Morgan, Discussion of Code ofEvidenceProposedFinalDraft, 19
A.L.I. PROC. 74, 143-44, 152 (1942) (setting forth the remarks of Judge Learned
Hand).
84See zd. at 138, 157
85See MCCORMICK, supra note 43, § 98, at 200; see also 1 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 29, § 94, at 348-50.
" I have found no state case to support the proposition that the attorney-client





This choice reflects the position of the English common law17 and
some of the twenty-four states88 m the United States that have not adopted
a modem privilege rule. 9 When the client dies, the privilege goes on and
on, like the Energizer bunny Moreover, nobody needs to claim the
privilege, because mthese states the pnvilege applies automatically, unless
the client waived it or authorized somebody to waive it for him.
One example is Hitt v. Stephens,90 where all of the heirs of Mr. and
Mrs. Hitt, both of whom were long since dead, sued to recover the Hitts'
estate files from the lawyer who handled the Hitts' estates. Mr. Hitt's estate
had closed forty years before the suit was filed, and Mrs. Hitt's estate had
closed thirteen years before the suit was filed. The lawyerrefused to deliver
the estate files to the heirs, and the heirs brought a timely" replevin action
against him. The opinion in the case does not explain why the heirs wanted
the estate files. We can only speculate: perhaps the heirs wanted to track
down an obscure piece of family history, perhaps they were searching for
a missing asset, or perhaps they suspected the lawyer of skullduggery
Likewise the opinion does not divulge why the lawyer refused to turn over
the files voluntarily. Perhaps the files included unsavory information about
Mr. and Mrs. Hitt, perhaps the Hitts had told their lawyer unflattering
things about their relatives, perhaps the lawyer had lost or destroyed the
87 The English common law position is captured m the maxi "once privileged,
always privileged," meaning that a privileged communication remains privileged
foreverunless the client waives the privilege or authorizes it to be waived. See, e.g.,
Bullivant v. Attorney-General for Victoria, [1901] L.R.-A.C. 196, 206 (1901)
(opinion of Lord Lindley). See also Lord Taylor of Gosforth's historical review of
privilege law nR v. DerbyMagistrates' Court, exparteB, 4 All E.R. 526, 537-41
(1995).
8 The twenty-four states are Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, West Virgina, and Wyoming.
89 By "modem privilege rule," I mean an attorney-client privilege rule that is
patterned onUNIF.R.EVID. 502 (1974) (amended 1986), deleted FED. R. EVID. 503,
repnnted in 24 WRIGHT& GRAHAM, supra note 21, RejectedRule 503, at37, UNIF
R. EVID. 26 (1953), or MODEL CODE OF EVID. §§ 209-10 (1942).
o Hitt v. Stephens, 675 N.E.2d 275 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
91 The court held that the replevin action was timely on the theory that the
plaintiffs first discovered that they had a cause of action when the lawyer refused
to turn the estate files over to them. See id. at 277
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files and was embarrassed to say so, or perhaps the lawyer had handled the
Hitts' estates inproperly and wanted to keep it a secret. In any event, the
court held that the estate files were protected by the attorney-client
privilege, that the privilege survived the death of Mr. and Mrs. Ilitt, that
after their death nobody could waive the privilege for them, that no
exception to the privilege applied to the case, and that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to recover the estate files.92
3. An Arbitrary Period Set by Statute
Giving the privilege eternal life and making it automatic (rather than
requiring it to be claimed by an appropriate person) can cause mischief, as
it would in Hitt v. Stephens, above, if the lawyer were using it to protect
himself rather than his dead clients. To avoid this risk, a legislature could
set an arbitrary period for the life of the privilege, such as seven years after
the client's death or fifty years after the client's death. Simon Frankel
suggested ths idea but rejected it as more trouble than it would be worth.93
My research has not discovered any jurisdiction that has implemented this
alternative.
4. The Closing of the Client's Estate
I believe that in at least twenty-five of the fifty states, the evidence
rules that codify the attorney-client privilege ought to be interpreted as
terminating the privilege at the closing of the deceased client's estate. The
following paragraphs explain how both the plain meaning and the
legislative background of the rules support this interpretation.
Twenty-six 94 of the fifty states have adopted modem attorney-client
privilege rules, meaning an evidence rule or statute patterned on the
American Law Institute's ("A.L.I.") Model Code ofEvidence,95 the original
' See id. at 278-79. Other examples of the eternal privilege at work include In
re Estate of Weinberg, 509 N.Y.S.2d 240, 242 (Sur. Ct. N.Y County 1986),
modified by In re Bemy, 517 N.Y.S.2d 474 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Bailey v.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, 179 N.W.2d 560, 564-65 (Iowa 1970);
and State v. McDermott, 651 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1995).
93 See Frankel, supra note 29, at 72-73 n.151.
' The twenty-six states are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
" MODEL CODE OF EVID. § 209(c) (1942).
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Uniform Rules of Evidence,96 Federal Rule of Evidence 503,91 which the
Supreme Court approved but Congress deleted, or the revised Uniform
Rules of Evidence,9" which were based on the enacted Federal Rules of
Evidence plus the privilege rules that Congress deleted. In all twenty-six
of these states, the attorney-client privilege is not eternal, and it does not
come into play automatically Instead, the privilege arises only when it is
properly claimed by a person who is entitled to do so.99
a. The Plain Meaning of the Rules in Twenty-Five States
In twenty-five of the twenty-six states, when the client is a natural
person (rather than a corporation or other entity) and is deceased, the
person who can claim the privilege is the deceased client's "personal
representative." 1 Further, mall twenty-five ofthese states, the person who
96 UNIF R. EvID. 26(1) (1953).
97 FED. R. EvID. 503 (deleted), repnnted in 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
21, Rejected Rule 503, at 37
9 8 UNIF. R. EvID. 502 (1974).
99 See, for example, Kentucky's Rule 503, KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 422A.0503
(Micle 1992), discussed infra text accompanying notes 102-04.
10 The one exception is Louisiana. See LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 506 (West
1995), which was patterned on UNIF R. EVID. 502. Uniform Rule 502(c) says:
"The privilege may be claimed by the client, the client's guardian or conservator,
[or] the personal representative of a deceased client "Id. Louisiana took that
phrase out and substituted the following m its place: "The privilege may be claimed
by the client, the client's agent or legal representative "LA. CODE EVID. ANN.
art. 506(D). The legislative history and case law yield no clue about the derivation
or intended meaning of the added term "client's agent," but the Louisiana State
Law Institute's comment k to art. 506 does explain the term "legal representative"
as follows: "To conform to Louisianaterminology the phrase 'legal representative'
was substituted for the phrase 'guardian or conservator, or by his personal
representative if he is deceased' The term 'legal representative' is defined m
Code of Civil Procedure Article 5251." Id. art. 506(D) cmt. k. The cited definition
states: 'Legal representative' includes an administrator, provisional administrator,
admimstrator ofavacant succession, executor, dative testamentary executor, tutor,
administrator of the estate of a minor child, curator, receiver, liquidator, trustee,
and any officer appointed by a court to administer an estate under its jurisdiction."
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 5251(10) (West 1998). My research has produced
no further legislative guidance or case law to explain whether the Louisiana
drafters were simply trying to translate Uniform Rule 502 into terms that fit
Louisiana's legal system, or whether they actually wanted to broaden the category
of people who can claim the privilege on behalf of a dead client.
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was the lawyer at the time of the confidential communication can clan the
privilege on behalf ofthe client."'1 Kentucky Rule of Evidence ("K.R.E.")
503 10 is typical and provides a good example. After defining the key terms
such as "client" and "lawyer," K.R.E. 503 states the basic privilege rule: "A
client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person
from disclosing a confidential communication made for the purpose of
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client "103
The rule then states who is entitled to claim the privilege, as follows:
The privilege may be claimed by the client, the client's guardian or
conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client, or the
successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association,
or other organization, whether or not m existence. Theperson who was
the lawyer at the time of the communication is presumed to have
authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client."°
When lawyers use the term "personal representative" m a carefully
drafted document, such as a statute or rule of court, they ordinarily (though
not invariably) do so as a term of art meaning "executor or admmistra-
tor"-the person appointed by a will or a court to handle a dead person's
estate and related affairs. 105 When the personal representative has finished
this work, the supervising court closes the estate and discharges the
personal representative.) 6 Thus, the plain meaning of the evidence rules m
twenty-five states, exemplified by K.R.E. 503, suggests that when the
deceased client's estate closes, and the personal representative is dis-
101 The lawyer cannot, of course, clain the privilege on the client's behalf if the
client has waived the privilege or instructed the lawyer not to claim it. In most of
the twenty-six states, the lawyer's authority to claim the privilege on the client's
behalf is expressed m language similar to this: "The person who was the lawyer or
the lawyer's representative at the time of the communication is presumed to have
authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client." UNIF R. EVID.
502.
112 KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 422A.0503 (Michie 1992).
103 Id. § 422A.0503(2).
"AId. § 422A.0503(3) (emphasis added).
'o
5 See UNnF PROBATE CODE § 1-201(36) (1993); GARNER, supra note 41, at
655; DAVID MELLINKOFF, MELLINKOFF'S DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL
USAGE 221,481 (1992); 32 WORDS & PHRASES 541-48 (1956), 290-92 (1998-99
Supp.).
'06 See 1 UNI. PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL §§ 3-608, 3-1001 to 1003
(Richard V Wellman ed., 2d ed. 1977).
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charged, the privilege ends because there is nobody left to claim it. But
what about the lawyer? Shouldn't the lawyer still be able to claim the
privilege? The answer ought to be "no." The evidence rules in all twenty-
five states make clear that the lawyer can claim the privilege only on behalf
of the client.' 7 While the client is alive, the lawyer's ability to claim the
privilege is derived from the client. After the client dies, the lawyer's
ability is derived from the personal representative; when the personal
representative ceases to exist, the lawyer's ability to claim the privilege
should also cease to exist.108
b. The Legislative Background of the Rules in Twenty-Five States
The legislative background of the attorney-client privilege rules m the
twenty-five states under consideration also supports the interpretation that
the privilege ends when the dead client's estate closes. All of these rules
are the great-grandchildren of the A.L.I. Model Code of Evidence. 09 The
Reporter of the Model Code was Harvard evidence professor Edmund M.
Morgan. If Morgan had had ins way, he would have ended the attorney-
client privilege upon the death of the client."0 That would have been too
great a departure from the then-existing state law, however, so he and his
Advisory Committee drafted Model Code of Evidence section 209, which
provides that when the client is a natural person, the "holder" of the
attorney-client privilege is "the client, while alive and not under guardian-
slp, or the guardian of an incompetent client, or the personal representa-
tive of a deceased client."'" This language was chosen because the drafters
'o See, e.g., KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 422A.0503(3).
' This line of reasoning is sketched out m 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
21, § 5498, at 485-86, and is adverted to m RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 127 cmt. c, reporter's note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
1996). Further, such reasoning is clearly at the root of the Law Revision
Commission's Comment to CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (West 1995), wlUch explains
that the lawyer can claim the privilege on behalf of the client only if there is a
"holder" (a person entitled to claim the privilege) m existence. "Hence," the
Comment says, "the privilege ceases to exist when the client's estate is finally
distributed and his personal representative is discharged." Id. § 954 cmt., see also
infra note 121.
09 MODEL CODE OF EVID. (1942).
"o See Morgan, supra note 83, at 138, 157
1' MODEL CODE OF EVID. § 209(c)(i). The A.L.I. membership debate about
section 209 clearly shows that the drafters were using "personal representative" as
a term of art meaning "executor or administrator." See Morgan, supra note 83, at
152-58; see also supra text accompanying note 105.
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viewed the privilege as something personal to the client, not as a feature of
the property that the client passes on to her survivors. I1 The objective was
to avoid disputes among the client's survivors, some of whom might wish
to assert the privilege and others of whom might wish to waive it.' The
natural consequence of section 209 is that the privilege ends when the
estate closes and the personal representative is discharged.
During the debate on section 209 before the A.L.I. memberslp, Judge
Learned Hand tried to get it amended so that the attorney-client privilege
would end when the client dies. 11 He made a formal motion to that effect,
but the motion was defeated.15 Shortly thereafter, a group ofultraconserva-
tive A.L.I. members tried to push section 209 m the opposite direction by
amending it to say that after the client's death the privilege could be
claimed, not only by the personal representative, but also by any heir or any
devisee of real property 116 That motion was defeated also.1 7 Thus, the
legislative background of Model Code of Evidence section 209-the great-
grandfather of the attorney-client privilege rules in the twenty-five states
in question-pretty clearly indicates that the privilege was intended to end
at the closing of the deceased client's estate.
Just as a great-grandfather's curly hair can be passed down from one
generation to the next, the role of the personal representative in the
attorney-client privilege has been passed down from the Model Code
through all the successive generations ofevidence law projects. The Model
Code was reworked and improved in the original version of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence promulgated in 1953,1 and the personal representa-
112 See Morgan, supra note 83, at 137-38.
.1. See id. Professor Morgan offered an illustration. Suppose client C owns
Blackacre and Whiteacre. Chas confidential communications aboutBlackacrewith
one attorney, and confidential communications about Whiteacre with a different
attorney. C's will devises Blackacre to is son B and Whiteacre to is daughter W
The will also appoints C's friend E as his executor. Who can claim the privilege
after C dies? B and Wjointly9 Either B or W9 B as to Blackacre, and Was to
Whiteacre? Morgan's answer, and the answer given in section 209, is that onlyE
can claim the privilege: E is C's "personal representative," and the privilege is
personal to C, not a feature of the property that passes to B and W See d.
14 See Id. at 143-44.
11 See id. at 152, 154.16 See id. at 156-58.
117 id. at 158.
"
8 SeePrefatoryNote to the Orginal 1974 Rules ofEvidence, 13AUNIF. LAWS
ANN. 3 (1994) [heremafterPrefatoryNote]. These uniform laws were approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at the annual
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tive's role m the attorney-client privilege was not significantly changed. 9
The California Law Revision Commission used the Uniform Rules as a
starting pomt when they drafted the California Evidence Code, and they too
left the personal representative's role substantively unchanged."2 The
Californa Law Revision Commission did add one new feature: the
Commission stated explicitly what was only implicit m the Model Code
and the Uniform Rules-when the client has died, the estate has been closed,
and the personal representative has been discharged, the lawyer can no
longer claim the privilege. In short, the privilege ends when the client's
estate closes.' 2
1
The next generation came along m the 1960s, when work began on
what ultimately became the Federal Rules of Evidence." The drafting
conference in 1974.
"9 See Unif. R. Evid. 26(1) (1953), reprinted in JAMES F. BAILEY II & OSCAR
M. TRELLES II, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND
RELATED DOCuMENTS 161, 179 (1980) ("The [attorney-client] privilege may be
clanned by the client m person orby his lawyer, or if incompetent, by his guardian,
or if deceased, by his personal representative.").
12 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 953(c) (West 1995) (providing that when the client
is dead, the holder of the privilege becomes the client's personal representative).
121 See id. §§ 953(c), 954(c) and accompanying Law Revision Commission
Comments. Cief Justice Rehnquist cited tlus California material in a footnote to
the Swdler & Berlin majority opinion. He seemed to suggest that California's
position is out m left field and that no other state has emulated California. See
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2085 n.2 (1998). With all
respect, the Cief Justice missed the point California's position is the same as the
Model Code's position m 1942 and the Uniform Rules' position in 1953; the only
difference is that California explained what it was doing rather than leaving it to
implication. I have looked carefully and cannot find any case law-from California
or any of the other twenty-four states with privilege rules descended from the
Model Code-that discusses what happens to the privilege after the client's estate
closes. In the absence of case law, the plain meaning and legislative background
of the rules are the only guideposts. Notice that ChiefJustice Rehnquist's footnote
was not necessary to the decision m the case. The appellate record in Swidler &
Berlin did not include the fact that Vincent Foster's estate was still in probate in
Arkansas when Starr tried to obtain the privileged notes and when the case was
heard in the Supreme Court, but one of the Justices drew out that fact during the
oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument, at 10, Swdler & Berlin (No. 97-
1192), available in 1998 WL 309279. Thus, Swidler & Berlin does not decide,
even under the federal common law of privilege, whether the attorney-client
privilege does or does not stay alive after the client's estate closes.
"See Prefatory Note, supra note 118.
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committee used the Uniform Rules, the Kansas Code (which was based
entirely on the Uniform Rules), and the California Evidence Code as
guidelines for its work.'2 When the drafters reached the attorney-client
privilege, they followed the well-worn path: the client's personal represen-
tative was given the same role as m the Model Code, the original Uniform
Rules, the California Evidence Code, and the Kansas Code. 124 After
Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, minus the privilege
rules,125 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws revised the Uniform
Rules in 1974 to make them conform to the newly adopted Federal Rules.
The Commissioners did, however, restore the privilege rules that Congress
had jettisoned.126 Thus, the present version of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence includes Rule 502 on the attorney-client privilege; like all of its
predecessors, Uniform Rule 502 gives the familiar role to the deceased
client's personal representative.1 27 The same, of course, is true of all the
state attorney-client privilege rules that have been adopted since 1974 and
have been based on either deleted Federal Rule of Evidence 503 or
Uniform Rule of Evidence 502.121
C. Why Should We Care About the Duration of the Attorney-Client
Privilege After the Client's Death?
Why should we care how long the attorney-client privilege lasts after
the client dies? If the Supreme Court majority was correct m Swidler &
Berlin that at least some clients are very concerned about what happens to
their reputations, their families, and their friends after they die,12 9 then we
ought to care whether the privilege lasts for eternity or only for a few years
until the client's estate closes. At present in the United States, geography
makes a substantial difference. In some states, the privilege lasts only for
a few years, while m others it lasts forever.
'23See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 103 (a) advisory committee's note (citing Kansas law,
California law, and the Uniform Rules).
'
24 See FED. R. EvID. 503(c) (deleted), reprinted in 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 21, Rejected Rule 503, at 37, 38.
25 See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
" See Prefatory Note, supra note 118.
127 See UNIF. R. EVID. 502.
" The states in question are those listed supra note 94, less Califorma and
Kansas, which based their privilege rules on the 1953 version of the Uniform
Rules, and less Louisiana because of the uncertainty expressed supra note 100.
129 See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2086 (1998).
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Swidler & Berlin tells us that, m a case governed by the federal
common law of pnvilege, the privilege remains intact after the client dies,
but the Court did not decide how long it lasts.' Swidler & Berlin reminds
us that an uncertain privilege is nearly as bad as no privilege at all.' When
a client needs to confide in her lawyer, is she likely to know what state's
law will apply when some zealous litigant goes after her confidential
information? Can she predict that the issue will arise m a federal question
case rather than a diversity case or a state court case? If her lawyer is
conscientious and tries to caution her about the duration of the privilege
before she divulges the confidential information,'32 will the lawyer have
anything but guesswork to go on? Probably not, at least until the law on
this subject becomes more settled. Until then, it is probably best to err on
the side of caution and to assume that the privilege will end when the
client's estate is settled. The lawyer should also remember that total
accuracy m a cautionary statement ofthis kind will produce so much detail
that the client will not be able to understand it. The lawyer must obviously
use common sense in tailoring the caution to the client and the situation.
The following is an example of an informally-worded warning that can be
cut down or expanded to fit the particular situation. It combines the
attorney-client privilege and the ethical duty to preserve confidences, and
it attempts to strike a workable compromise between accuracy and
befuddlement.
I will keep in confidence what you are about to tell me, subject to five
limitations. I may reveal what you are about to tell me m these five
situations: 1) if revealing itwill prevent someone's death orsenous bodily
injury;,33 2) if revealing it will prevent you from using my legal services
130 1 do not mean to suggest that the Court ought to have reached that issue,
which was clearly unnecessary to dispose of the case at hand. See supra note 121.
' See Swzdler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2087
3 Surely a good lawyer should attempt to do this. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.4(b) (1998) (expressing the duty to explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions); Lee Ann Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About Limits
on Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REV 441 (1990); see also THOMAS L. SHAFFER
&ROBERTF COCHRANJR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, ANDMORALRESPONSIBILITY 40-
54 (1994) (concerning lawyer's general moral responsibility to client).
1 Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1998),
with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERs § 132 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (stating an exception to the attorney-client privilege for
future crime or fraud), and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
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to commit a crime or fraud that will cause major financial harm to
someone;"3 3) if I get into a dispute with you or someone else about my
duties to you or your duties to me; 135 4) if you have died, and I am asked
some types of questions aboutyour will or your property transfers during
your lifetime;'36 or 5) if you have died and your estate has already been
settled, and I am asked in court to reveal things you have told me in
confidence.
LAWYERS § 117A (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998) (stating an exception to the
etlucal duty concerning prevention of death or serious bodily mjury from whatever
cause).
'3 Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132
(Pro-posed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (stating an exception to the attorney-client
privilege for future crime or fraud), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 117B (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998) (stating an
exception to the ethical duty concerning future crime or fraud that will cause
financial mjury). But see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)
(1998) (allowing no exception to the ethical duty for mere financial injury).
135 Compare MODELRULES OFPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1998)
(creating an exception to ethical duty concerning clais of breach of duties running
between attorney and client), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE LAWGOVERNING
LAWYERS § 133(1) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (stating an exception to
privilege concernng breach of attorney-client duties), and id. §§ 116, 117 (stating
exceptions to the etlucal duty concerning attorney self-protection and compensation
disputes).
136 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 131
(stating an exception to the privilege when decedent's communications are at issue
m disputes between two people who both claim through the deceased client m
either testamentary or inter vivos transactions).
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